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The Devaluation of Consent in The Rape of Lucrece
Scholarly work on the perennial problem of rape has traditionally placed the blame of
perpetuation on the flaws inherent in patriarchal systems. Some scholars have pointed to the
constructed gender hierarchies of patriarchy as fertile grounds for rape to flourish (Pallotti 218).
Scholars often read Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece this way, with an emphasis on how
Tarquin’s construction of Lucrece’s femininity—as whole and inaccessible—is what motivates
his rape (Quay 7). Other scholarship suggests that gaps in sex crime laws are responsible for the
perpetuation of rape (Decker and Baroni 1167). This argument highlights the lack of legislative
contrast between The Rape of Lucrece’s setting in ancient Rome, the monarchical republic of
Shakespeare’s day, and even the modern United States. An additional scholarly track implies that
disproportionate representation in patriarchal systems could be culpable for keeping rape
relevant (Lake 266). Reading The Rape of Lucrece through this lens suggests that the switch to a
slightly altered form of patriarchy in republicanism is insufficient to crush the real cause of rape.
Each of these traditional arguments finds sufficient backing for a compelling case in The Rape of
Lucrece.
The consideration of all these arguments, however, coupled with a careful analysis of the
poem itself necessitates arguing for a larger perpetuator of rape: the devaluation of consent in
patriarchal systems, on both a sexual and political level. In Shakespeare’s time, political consent
was an ostensibly progressive concept nevertheless riddled with shortcomings. Growing
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emphasis on “government by consent” seemed negligible in the face of disproportionate
representation; how could a system claim to value consent when only the powerful had a voice?
(Lake 273) Literature by Shakespeare’s contemporaries explores sexual consent, presenting
female agency as synchronously limited and necessary. Male anxiety shaped this kind of
narrowly bounded consent, depicted by authors like Thomas Heywood and Thomas Middleton,
which actually fostered greater female subordination rather than autonomy (Detmer-Goebel
156). Today, the well-intentioned hyperfocus on consent in rape cases has actually led to a
submersion of agency beneath context or structure (Munro 420). And if the Harvey Weinstein
allegations have taught us anything, it is that contemporary America still undervalues consent.
Some scholarship has even claimed that our society valorizes non-consent (Oliver 4).
With alarming consistency across centuries, sexual and political consent have been
limited, undermined, or generally devalued. In Shakespeare’s poem, Lucretia’s interactions with
her two servants—one female and one male—serve to expose the paradox of consent: that a
servant’s consent is not explicitly valued, yet the very power of his or her master is dependent
upon such consent. This paradox is applicable across patriarchal systems including monarchy
and, ironically, republicanism. In a republic, freeborn-slave or male-female dynamics take the
place of the master-servant relationship portrayed by Lucretia and her servants. I will argue that
this paradox of consent is the basis for the devaluation of consent in The Rape of Lucrece, and by
extension in republicanism; and that this devaluation results in the gender hierarchies, gaps in
sex crime laws, and disproportionate representation that perpetuate rape.
The Rape of Lucrece’s first significant interaction between Lucretia and her maid justifies
the devaluation of female consent by constructing femininity as irrational and helpless. The
poem’s description of the maid’s empathy and its effect on Lucretia utilizes imagery of
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overwhelming forces of nature to characterize female reactions and underscore their
helplessness. For example, the poem compares the maid’s tears to “swelling drops” of morning
dew, triggered by “those faire suns set in her mistress’ sky’ who in a salt-waved ocean, quench
their light” (1228-31). In a similar description, the poem equates women with “ivory conduits
coral cisterns filling” (1234). These images highlight the overwhelming quality of the natural
elements; things are filling, swelling, and being quenched, as if beyond the control of the
women. As Shakespeare points out, the maid’s emotions have no basis in reason as there is “no
cause but company of her drops’ spilling” (1236). The poem even ventures so far as to claim that
the “gentle sex” are prone to emotion devoid of logic to the point of self-inflicted violence—
“they drown their eyes or break their hearts”—which becomes a haunting foreshadower of
Lucretia’s suicide (1239). The insinuation present in this snapshot is that women, when left to
their own nature without male guidance, are incapable of overcoming emotionality with
rationality. This construction of femininity is consistent with other 16th century literature like
Middleton’s Women Beware Women, which declares that women are not “rationally equipped to
respond to ethical dilemmas” (Detmer Goebel 153). Such a conclusion provides justification to
“protectionists” who use an over-inclusive definition of “vulnerability” to push paternalistic
agendas. Grounded on initiatives designed to empower the vulnerable, these agendas can actually
reduce individual safety and options while increasing marginalization and offering support only
to those who conform to “less transgressive gendered lives” (Munro 428). Ultimately, the
construction of the maid’s femininity in The Rape of Lucrece as irrational and helpless shifts the
value of consent’s balance away from autonomy and toward protection. This shift moralizes
maintaining gender hierarchies as male duty while ignoring how such hierarchies also perpetuate
rape, as in the case of Lucretia.
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As the interaction between mistress and female servant progresses, The Rape of Lucrece
further validates the devaluation of female consent by suggesting that women are merely the
product of their context. The poem presents a stark image of men with marble minds and women
with minds of wax, which implies that women’s minds are malleable, “formed as marble will”
(1241). Much like a marble seal forms an impression in wax, so women’s minds are impressed or
determined “in them by force” which force is unequivocally male and inextricably tied to sexual
force (1243). The theory that emerges from this image is that women are what is done to them.
Although the application of such a theory is well-intentioned in leveling the playing field for
victims in modern rape trials, an overemphasis on concepts like “exploitation” and
“vulnerability” relating to context can actually undermine the value of the victim’s consent
(Munro 420). Believing that women are the products of their context dismisses the importance of
their own agency, thereby creating a second kind of victimization on the underbelly of “justice.”
The poem expands this dangerous idea of women as products by absolving them of any guilt
while also absolving them of their will: “No man inveigh against the withered flower, But chide
rough winter that the flower hath killed” (1254-55). The final image the poem leaves to support
the idea that women are the products of their context, is that of the lord-tenant relationship:
“those proud lords, to blame, make weak-made women tenants to their shame” (1259-60). In
such a feudalist system, women as the tenants would have been little more than property to their
lords, with lives shaped in large part by the will of these men. The danger in these lines is the
synchronous absolution and devaluation of consent through the subversion of agency to
structure. Although scholars may argue for the implementation of non-coercion and nondeception legislation to close the gaps in sex crime laws that perpetuate rape (Decker and Baroni
1167), it is troubling that these proposals invariably find their roots in the argument for context
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over consent. The Rape of Lucrece makes robust connections between metaphorical images and
the devalued state of female consent under a patriarchy that says woman are not only incapable
of rationality on their own, but are actually incapable of being their own, free from impression by
their male context. These connections suggest that scholars who advocate for verbal consent laws
strike more efficiently at the issue of victim justice by prizing female consent over contextual
elements that drown out her voice.
The Rape of Lucrece then zeros in on the paradox of consent by presenting Lucretia with
limited agency that is nonetheless necessary for her to support her husband, and by extension the
very patriarchy that devalues her consent. Lucretia has authority over her maid, derived from the
patriarchal structure of Collatine’s household. Though she may weep and share her grief with the
maid, in time she reasserts her superiority over the girl when she suddenly speaks rationally: “If
tears could help, mine own would do me good” (1274). This pattern of the rational mistress
chastising her servant repeats when the emotional maid “request(s) to know your heaviness” and
Lucretia emphatically replies, “O, peace!” as if to command the maid to calm herself down, and
then presents her logic: “If it should be told, the repetition cannot make it less” (1283-85). It is
significant that of the two women it is Lucretia, despite being the actual victim of the crime, who
is capable of rational thought in this moment. Yet this rationality, which the poem juxtaposes
against the maid’s emotionality to highlight its masculine connotation, is all Lucretia is capable
of in reaction to her rape. In early modern rape stories, rape victims never enacted their own
revenge; the few stories with heroines who tried, as in John Fletcher’s Bonduca, characterized
these women as dishonorable (Detmer-Goebel 149). Rather, these stories limited the victim’s
options or agency to support of her husband through actively resisting the rape even after it
happened to keep it from turning into adultery. Lucretia fears “shame that might ensue, by that
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her death” or rape “to do her husband wrong;” and it is “by this” fear that she musters an
incomprehensible strength to be rational in a moment of utter despair (1263-64; 68). She realizes
that if she reveals her story to the wrong person at the wrong time, it may bring deeper shame to
her husband and herself. Thus, her despondent assertion that it is torture “when more is felt than
one hath power to tell” emerges not as a traumatic inability to speak, but a repressed desire to do
so in the face of shame (1287-88). So she uses her acutely limited agency to sacrifice her needs
for Collatine and choose rationality, by refusing to share her plight with the maid and instead
sending for her kinsman to do what she cannot: seek revenge against Tarquin. This interaction
provides an example of a woman whose agency is clearly limited to a few options, but is in the
same moment necessary for her husband’s support. This is the first instance in which the poem
grapples with the paradox of consent, by showing how Lucretia’s inferior consent is
simultaneously limited or unvalued and necessary for her husband to maintain power. Such a
paradox could not exist without the gender constructions previously discussed which depict
women as “sexual, dangerous, irrational” and the product of context (Pallotti 218). This uneven
footing between man and woman is what creates the paradox of consent in the case of marriage,
but other disparate power relations can produce the paradox as well.
The Rape of Lucrece uses the interaction between Lucretia and her male servant to show
how this paradox of consent leads to its devaluation in a mistress-servant dynamic. When the
male servant, a messenger, comes before Lucretia to collect her letter, he is “blushing on her
with steadfast eye” which signifies his admiration for and unshakable loyalty to her as his
mistress (1339). Lucretia, however, “thought he blushed to see her shame,” which fills her with
mistrust and even greater shame (1344). Thus they stand at an impasse, as “her earnest eye did
make him more amazed,” or terrified, and “the more she thought he spied in her some blemish”
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(1365-58). Regardless of the noble intentions on both sides of this interaction—in his case,
loyalty, in hers, redemption—the servant and Lucretia trap each other in a cycle of pain by
inciting growing shame and terror respectively. Lucretia has a limited measure of authority over
this boy by virtue of her place in Collatine’s household, which indicates the she should not need
his consent to govern his actions. Even so, he gives it silently but fully, submitting to her
authority with “true-respect” and as a “pattern of the worn-out age,” indicating his antique sense
of chivalry and service (1347-50). Yet his silence keeps Lucretia frozen; he “talk(ed) in deeds”
and “laid no words to gage” which “kindled duty kindled her mistrust (1348-52). Simply because
the boy does not verbally consent to her command, Lucretia’s confidence and efficacy as
mistress crumbles in a striking illustration of the paradox of consent. Although as mistress she
should not technically value the servant’s consent, she clearly cannot maintain her power without
it.
Faced with this same paradox on a grander political scale, radicals in Shakespeare’s time
proposed a surprising solution: government fundamentally based on the consent of the governed.
Such an idea doubtless seemed counter-intuitive to those in political power who wished to stay
there. Yet these progressive “crown-in-parliament” advocates argued that the people, by virtue of
them first choosing a king, were actually the fundamental creators of the kingdom. In theory,
“just as voices of consent at the first produced a political head out of the political body, so now
the political body could repeat the trick again, producing a new head for itself out of its own
political materials” (Lake 273). The idea was that if the governed were the source of the
government’s original power, then creating a political system that valued their consent would
actually protect the powerful. In application, however, valuing consent was easier said than done
because the proposed “tempered republicanism” relied on flawed, disproportionate
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representation. This representative system allowed only gave voice to the powerful, while
shutting out minorities and those on the fringes of society. Once again and under the guise of
improvement, the political system was rapidly devaluing consent. This same devaluation
continues in modern republics like the United States, where an ever-widening gap between
representation and the governed reveals a disturbing lack of concern about consent. Given such
clear apathy, we cannot feign surprise at the perpetuation of rape in the United States, or even at
scholarly assertions that non-consent has become openly valorized or celebrated in our society
(Oliver 20). Think of the Access Hollywood tape released just over a year ago, which captured
now President Trump bragging about his sexual assault conquests in graphic detail, including his
attitude towards seeking consent: “I don’t even wait” (Fahrenthold 4). Against this modern
socio-political backdrop, the perennial relevance of Lucretia’s interaction with her male servant
becomes unsurprising considering what it reveals about devaluation through the paradox of
consent.
Some scholarship might suggest that Lucretia’s reaction to the impasse with her male
servant is not about consent at all, but purely about their sexual dynamics given that a man just
raped her. This track could cite that “she thought he blushed as knowing Tarquin’s lust” or
because he understands and perhaps even shares it (1354). Such a reading suggests that Lucretia,
as the victim of traumatic sexual assault by a male, faces a confrontation with this male servant
soon after her trauma, which reduces her to shame and fear of further violence simply because of
his gender. Yet soon after, Lucretia speaks most eloquently to her husband, kinsmen, and all the
“other company” of men Collatine rushes home with (1584). If general distrust of men were the
issue in her interaction with the servant, she should not have been able to inspire a whole group
of them to “plight your honourable faiths to me” and “be suddenly revenged on my foe” (1683-
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90). Rather, it is the paradox of consent that plays a key in both of these interactions between
Lucretia and men. When she speaks to her avengers, she manages to extract a promise that as
“knights, by their oaths” who “should right poor ladies’ harms,” they will “chase injustice with
revengeful arms” (1693-94). No disparate power structure exists to complicate the issue of
consent here; these “knights” and “fair lords” have free-volition and an ability to consent that is
valuable in Ancient Rome. But in the case of Lucretia’s servant, his silence highlights the
mistress’s dependency upon his consent; its absence incapacitates her. Thus, The Rape of
Lucrece exposes the destructive effect the paradox of consent can have on those in power, which
exposition elucidates why those powerful individuals consistently devalue consent.
This devaluation through the paradox of consent was certainly inherent in the power
structures of monarchical rule, found both in Tarquin’s corrupted kingship and Elizabeth’s early
modern court. Yet ironically, the system of government put in place by those who overthrow
Tarquin and the same system proposed by Elizabethan radicals, is republicanism, which itself
relies on hierarchies that recreate the paradox of consent. Therefore, it is erroneous to read The
Rape of Lucrece as a political commentary advocating republicanism as the solution to tyrannical
behaviors like rape. Indeed, it is erroneous to suppose rape is a tyrannical behavior at all, rather
than a societal product perpetuated by the devaluation of consent in monarchies and republics
alike. Because those in power wish to decrease their dependency on their lessers’ consent by
devaluing it, gender hierarchies proliferate, gaps in sex crime laws widen, and disproportionate
representation runs unchecked in a horrific cycle that reproduces rape. It is this trifecta born from
the devaluation of consent that forces us to relive, repeat, and retell The Rape of Lucrece in
versions from ancient Rome to Weinstein’s Hollywood.
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